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We derive a polynomial time algorithm to compute a stable solution
in a mixed matching market from an auction procedure as presented by
Eriksson and Karlander [2]. As a special case we derive an O(nm) algo-
rithm for bipartite matching that does not seem to have appeared in the
literature yet.
1 Introduction
We consider a mixed matching market as introduced by Eriksson and Karlander
[2] which generalizes Stable Marriage [5] and the Assignment Game [10].
This note was developed in parallel with [8] where we derive another polynomial
time algorithm, to compute a stable solution for the same model, from the key
lemma in Sotomayor [11]. In that paper a stable solution is shown to exist.
Both algorithms run in O(n4), where 2n is the number of players and n2 is the
size of a problem instance.
In the next section we briefly introduce the model and its notion of stability.
Then we design a polynomial time algorithm to compute a stable solution in
Section 3. Finally, we discuss the behaviour of the algorithm in the special cases
of Stable Matching, Assignment Game and cardinality matching and summarize
differences from and similarities to the algorithm from [8].
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2 Notation
We have two sets of players P (firms indexed by i) and Q (workers indexed
by j) w.l.o.g. satisfying |P | = |Q| =: n. Let furthermore P ∪ Q be partitioned
into flexible players (F ) and rigid players (R). Consider the complete bipartite
graph on P ∪˙Q. An edge (i, j) is called rigid if one of i or j is in R and flexible,
otherwise. For each edge (i, j) there are nonnegative numbers aij and bij . The
sum aij+bij is the productivity of a cooperation between i and j. If i cooperates
with j and (i, j) is a free edge and this productivity can be freely divided into
payoffs ui and vj while ui = aij and vj = bij must hold if (i, j) is a rigid edge.
Definition 2.1. A payoff (u, v) is called stable if for any edge (i, j) ∈ P × Q
we have
(i) ui + vj ≥ aij + bij if (i, j) is a free edge and
(ii) ui ≥ aij or vj ≥ bij if (i, j) is a rigid edge.
A stable outcome is a stable payoff (u, v) together with a bijective map µ : P → Q
(denoted by (u, v;µ)) so that
(iii) ui ≥ 0 and vj ≥ 0 for all (i, j) ∈ P ×Q.
(iv) ui + vj = aij + bij for µ(i) = j and {i, j} ⊆ F .
(v) ui = aij and vj = bij for µ(i) = j and {i, j} ∩R 6= ∅.
Let µ : P → Q be a map. If µ(i) = j then we say i proposes to j. A proposal
is called free or rigid if the corresponding edge is free resp. rigid. Any firm
i ∈ µ−1(Q) is called mapped. If there are firms i1, i2 so that µ(i1) = µ(i2) = j
then j is called doubly mapped. We denote by
QU the set of unmapped workers,
Q2µ the set of doubly mapped workers,
QR the set of workers that have a rigid proposal, and by






aij + bij − vj if (i, j) is a free edge
aij if (i, j) is rigid and vj < bij
aij if (i, j) is rigid and vj = bij and µ(i) = j
0 otherwise
define the possible profit of i from j if j receives vj .
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The strategy of the algorithm is the following: The map µ always defines stable
relations but is not necessarily injective. In the course of the algorithm we
will try and increase µ(P ), keeping stability of the relations, until the map is
injective. The procedure to increase µ(P ) acts on the augmentation digraph
G(v,µ) = (P ∪Q,A) with backward arcs (j, i) for µ(i) = j and forward arcs (i, j)
for j ∈ D(v,µ)i where
D
(v,µ)
i = {j ∈ Q | fij = max
k
fik}
is the set of workers that maximize the potential benefit of firm i. A directed
path P in G(v,µ) that connects a doubly mapped worker j1 ∈ Q2µ with another
worker js is called alternating resp. augmenting if js is not mapped.
3 An Algorithm to Find a Stable Outcome
Eriksson and Karlander [2] assume integer data and in one step increase a free
payoff by at most one. We modify this approach in such a way that we increase
the payoff by the smallest possible amount that changes the augmentation di-
graph. Our strategy to make the map µ : P → Q bijective is as follows: As in
the classical “men-propose-women-dispose” algorithm from Gale and Shapley
[5] workers with more than one rigid proposal choose the best one and dispose
the rest. This way some firms become temporarily unmapped. Each of these
unmapped firms has to place another proposal until every worker has at most
one rigid proposal. Next, we search the graph G(v,µ) for alternating paths that
reach a worker in QU ∪QR and alternate the matching. If none of the above is
possible, we increase the payoffs v of workers which are reachable by an alter-
nating path until G(v,µ) receives a new edge and the process is repeated until
the map becomes injective.
The algorithm uses several sub-procedures:




Dispose(j, i∗): Disposes all firms i 6= i∗ that made a rigid proposal to j, i. e. sets
µ(i) to be undefined for all i ∈ µ−1(j) \ {i∗}.
Alternate(P): µ is alternated along the alternating path P, i. e. all arcs are
reoriented and µ is modified such that it uses the new backward arcs. If
P is augmenting then the size of the image of µ increases by 1.
BFS(G,Q2R): Returns all vertices reachable from Q2R in G.
PlaceRigidProposals: This procedure is the “men propose – women dis-
pose” algorithm of Gale and Shapley [5]. Here, we denote by PU the set
of temporarily unmapped firms. See Algorithm 2.
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HungarianUpdate: Increases the payoffs of all workers reachable from a dou-
bly mapped worker. See Algorithm 3 for details.
Algorithm 1 An Algorithm to Find a Stable Outcome
v ← 0
PlaceRigidProposals
while Q2µ 6= ∅ do







while PU 6= ∅ do
for all i ∈ PU do
Propose(i)
end for
for all j ∈ Q2R do







ui ← maxj fij
∆← min{ui − fik | i ∈ P¯ , k ∈ Q \ Q¯}
for all j ∈ Q¯ do
vj ← vj +∆
end for
Theorem 3.1. Algorithm 1 eventually finishes with a stable outcome and can
be implemented to run in O(n4) time.
Proof. In any iteration of the inner loop of line 4 in Algorithm 1 |µ(P )| is in-
creased or a rigid proposal is disposed. If there is a path to Q\µ(P ) then |µ(P )|
increases. If the path ends in j ∈ QR then PlaceRigidProposals is called
and disposes at least one rigid edge. Note, that a rigid edge once disposed will
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never be proposed again. If no path exists at all then v is increased by Hun-
garianUpdate until this is the case and in each call of HungarianUpdate
at least one new arc shows up in G(v,µ). Thus, the procedure is finite.
PlaceRigidProposals can be implemented to run in O(n2) (see e. g. Gusfield
and Irving [7]). The while-loop in line 4 of Algorithm 1 might be iterated more
than once without finding a path as desired. Anyway, HungarianUpdate can
be implemented so that its consecutive calls until a path is found need O(n2)
time in sum by reusing the BFS-structure from the previous call and storing a
minimum distance ∆j from unmapped vertices and vertices in QR to the current
BFS forest (see e. g. Galil [6] or Hochsta¨ttler et al. [8] for details). Hence, after
O(n2) time steps we can augment µ or dispose a rigid edge which can happen
at most O(n2) times.
Next we will show that the algorithm produces a stable outcome. In any stage
of the algorithm let u¯i := maxj f
(v,µ)
ij . Then (u¯, v) is stable and (u¯, v;µ) satisfies
(iv) and (v) of Definition 2.1 since µ(i) = j implies j ∈ D(v,µ)i . As v monotoni-
cally increases we also have v ≥ 0. A worker with no proposer always has payoff
zero and is therefore of non-negative value to all firms. Hence together with (iv)
and (v) this implies u ≥ 0. When the algorithm terminates µ is bijective and
thus, (u¯, v;µ) is a stable outcome.
4 Special Cases and Remarks
When F = ∅ our model coincides with the Stable Marriage Model, since the aij
at firm i resp. bij at worker j may be replaced by preference lists. Since Q2R = ∅
implies Q2µ = ∅ the algorithm stops after the execution of PlaceRigidPro-
posals. Inside the while-loop of Algorithm 2 mapping edges to a worker in
Q2R are disposed and by updating vj never become proposals again. Here, pro-
posals are made in rounds. In any round a firm proposes to its favorite worker.
Then every worker choses his best proposal and disposes the other firms. This
corresponds to the famous “men propose – women dispose” introduced by Gale
and Shapley [5].
If R = ∅ and aij + bij ∈ {0, 1} for any edge (i, j) the problem reduces to finding
a matching of maximum cardinality among edges with productivity 1 (refered
to as 1-edges). The presented algorithm does not seem to have appeared in
the literature yet and differs from the standard approach which starts with an
empty matching and searches the graph of 1-edges for an augmenting path. The
algorithm presented here starts with a total but not surjective (and therefore
not injective) map µ. An alternating path from a doubly mapped worker to
an unmapped worker increases the size of the image of µ until µ is bijective,
i. e. a matching. While the standard approach is essentially due to Ford and
Fulkerson [3] the approach presented here reminds of the preflow-push algorithm
(see e. g. [1]). However, the strategy of lifting node potentials in preflow-push
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does not seem to have anything in common with the augmenting path procedure
used here. A naive implementation would lead to an O(nm) algorithm. We
wonder if this approach might lead to efficient implementations for cardinality
matching competing with existing algorithms.
If R = ∅ the algorithm reminds of the Hungarian Method. Like the latter our
method is a primal-dual algorithm but the subroutine for cardinality matching
is replaced as described above. The algorithm starts with a weighted vertex
cover (u, v) if we set ui ← maxj fij . The Hungarian Method in all its variants
searches for a path augmenting a given matching or increases the values vj until
such a path can be found (see Frank [4] for a transparent presentation). The
search is performed on a digraph where the matching edges are the backward
arcs. The main difference between our algorithm (for R = ∅) and the Hungarian
Method is the graph on which we look for alternating resp. augmenting paths
as we have all the mapping edges as backward arcs. Thus, our search tree in
average should be shorter.
The algorithm in [8] to find a stable outcome differs from the algorithm presented
here in various ways. In [8] (especially rigid) proposals are made asynchronously.
Furthermore, this algorithm is a direct extension of the Hungarian Method as
introduced in Kuhn [9, Variant 2], while the algorithm presented here is much
closer to the original “men propose – women dispose” algorithm of Gale and
Shapley [5]. Also the concepts of augmenting paths differ as here we augment
maps and there matchings are augmented. Nevertheless, the directed search
graphs have the same underlying graph.
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